The enterprise operated within an institutional environment where each institution's failures enabled the next:
- Detection (PBPD 2005–06): 23–24 minor victims identified → federal referral
- Diversion (DOJ/Acosta 2007–08): NPA → state plea, 13 months work release, co-conspirator immunity. CVRA violation (judicial finding, 2023)
- Suppression (FBI): 258 pages deleted; "prominent names" presentation sealed
- Banking I (JPMC 1998–2013): Five-year SAR gap; post-conviction retention; $1.08B retroactive SARs
- Banking II (Deutsche Bank 2013–2018): Post-conviction onboarding; AML override; retention despite flags
- Banking III (BNY as correspondent): $600M+; 270 suspicious wires; identified only post-arrest
- Delay (DOJ 2019–2026): Mass releases only under H.R. 4405
- Exposure (DOJ Feb 2026): 31 victim IDs exposed; 6 co-conspirator names concealed
Grade D (analytical synthesis). Does NOT establish coordination between institutions. Establishes that each institution's individual incentive-driven decisions collectively shielded the enterprise for 20+ years.