[GRADE A2 — EFTA documents]
[GRADE A2 — Internal DB emails]
EFTA01385872/892: Jun 2, 2015. Sabba to Todd Stevens, Chip Packard, Morris, Oldfield:
"Southern Financial missed its TRS reset payment, which was due yesterday. This is now showing up into swap break reports, which feeds into CB&S management."
"Southern Financial's treasurer (Rich Kahn) needs JE's sign off for each reset payment, which is typically done by middle/back office in the institutional side."
Morris response: "What is going on up there??? How about calling the bankers if you need assistance getting these things done."
WHY THIS MATTERS: Monthly TWTR TRS reset payments required Epstein's personal sign-off — extraordinary for institutional trading. Missed payment triggered CB&S management reporting — this was visible to senior Deutsche Bank leadership. Morris's angry response suggests this was a recurring frustration. Stevens AND Packard on the chain — both senior management aware of the operational dysfunction. "Swap break reports" = formal compliance/risk reporting triggered by the missed payment.
EFTA01386025 (May 27, 2015): Daniel Sabba to Morris (cc Packard, Todd Stevens, Stewart Oldfield):
"Paul — were you aware JE sued Citi? You mentioned today you assessed the likelihood of JE being a litigious client negligible, so would like to get more clarity on the lawsuit below."
Sabba attaches the full FINANCIAL TRUST CO. v. CITIBANK (2003) opinion — Epstein sued Citibank for $10M in the Virgin Islands over a bond obligation deal. Morris had told compliance Epstein was not litigious. This was wrong.
EFTA01458827 (Nov 10, 2015): Morris to Packard: "JE called, he requested coverage change, not working with DS, before I reach out to Todd wanted to discuss, between new investor sales/me/Stew we should be able to cover and increase flow business."
Packard responds: "Thanks, I am sandwiched today and this needs immediate attention... I am not as confident though that we can handle this through investor sales and you guys as this is non-advised business. Let's think this through carefully."
EFTA01470468 (Aug 19, 2014): Morris to Kirby: "Please be careful sending emails to clients without coordinating internally. Your email amanda to rich and darren created a lot of confusion. Pls cc your colleagues."
"Rich and Darren" = Richard Kahn and Darren Indyke. Morris enforcing information control around Epstein client communications.
EFTA01384038: KYC Print for Epstein's personal checking account states expected balance of $50,000 at 90 days and $100,000 at 1 year. Described as "Checking account for Jeffrey Epstein's personal daily use." At the time, Epstein had substantial assets in other accounts at the same bank. Note: Total AUM across all Epstein accounts at DB not independently verified in documents reviewed. The personal account KYC was orders of magnitude below the actual relationship scale — either a deliberate minimization to avoid enhanced scrutiny or a compliance process disconnected from reality.
EFTA01458792 (Nov 8, 2015, 5:37 AM): Epstein to Morris and Richard Kahn: "can i be covered by someone else besides daniel.. he called and asked me whether i wanted to buy in my 112 call. on the euro. to protect against a rebound.??!! it will clearly expire worthless.." Morris was the person Epstein escalated DB personnel complaints to — effectively making Morris the gatekeeper for who serviced the Epstein account. "Daniel" = Daniel Sabba, the same compliance officer who challenged Morris on Epstein's litigation history. Epstein's demand at 5:37 AM on a Sunday, tracking European markets overnight, documents a client who expected immediate responsiveness and treated DB staff as interchangeable servants.
[GRADE A2 — Internal DB email]
January 29, 2016. Ariane Dwyer to Morris: "Hi Paul, Here it is. As I mentioned I'm out next week but Vahe and Daniel will be here." Attachment: "SF Request for Research Enhanced Due Diligence 1.28.16.docx" Previously sent January 28, 2016 to Morris cc Stepanian/Sabba. Enhanced Due Diligence on Southern Financial initiated January 2016 — 2 months before account closure for fraud (March 2016). Morris personally received the EDD request.
[GRADE A2 — Internal DB emails]
September 2013 chain showing the actual asset transfer mechanics from JPM to DB. Morris (Sep 14, 2013): "spoke with JE this morning, will keep the positions that are problematic at JP until they mature, start acat process monday"
Kirby to Morris (Sep 20, 2013): Southern Financial — being sent out now; Jeepers — will hopefully be out in the next hour; Southern Trust — missing a signature, goes Monday; Haze — "only just sent to ACAT middle office... will not go out tonight."
Kirby (Sep 25, 2013): "Haze, Jeepers and Southern Trust have been sent. The originals are currently being medallion stamped and will be fedexed to arrive at JPM tomorrow morning. Harry has asked that I hold off on Southern Financial until we have confirmation that all assets have been moved to the one account we are transferring."
Shows the full ACAT transfer chain: 4 entities moving simultaneously from JPM to DB. Morris personally spoke with "JE" (Epstein) about which positions to keep at JPM. "Positions that are problematic at JP" suggests JPM compliance issues with certain holdings.
[GRADE A2 — Internal DB email]
October 22, 2015. Morris to Litchford (cc Oldfield, Dwyer, Stepanian): "Thanks for the help, we need to make sure going forward that we are cc'd on any significant wires going out of brokerage. Thanks" — Morris demanded visibility on all significant wire activity, active monitoring of Epstein fund flows through brokerage.
[GRADE A2 — DB bank statements]
April 2016: Gratitude America Elite Checking with Interest — $176,020.01
June 2016: Gratitude America Elite Money Market Deposit — $4,034,116.77
"For personal assistance call: Paul Morris"
Morris still listed on June 2016 statements — post his alleged departure period. $4M in "philanthropic" entity with no documented charitable disbursements.
EFTA01344596 (April 2016): Records indicate contact between Morris and Epstein associates after Morris's departure from the Epstein account.
Targeted DugganUSA searches across Batches 16-19 returned zero results for the following combinations:
⚠️ THIS NULL RESULT WAS OVERTURNED IN BATCH 51-55. AML Compliance DIRECTLY questioned Morris about a $400K wire to FT Real Estate, FirstBank Puerto Rico (EFTA01479252, Dec 9, 2015). Morris was contacted specifically because he was listed as PRIMARY OFFICER in the GCIS system. Cherie Quigley (AML Transaction Monitoring) was cc'd. The inquiry demanded: purpose of wire, relationship to FT Real Estate, domicile of FT Real Estate, with response required within 7 business days. Morris WAS engaged by AML compliance on Epstein-specific concerns.
Morris was still NOT CC'd on Jan Ford's ARRC conditions email and was NOT included in the AML escalation chain that led to the ARRC review. His departure from the Epstein account still has no documentary footprint. But the claim that Morris "never appeared with compliance" is false — AML Compliance directly questioned him as Primary Officer about a specific suspicious wire.
WHAT THIS SHOWS AND DOES NOT SHOW: Sabba's challenge shows internal tension — compliance caught Morris's mischaracterization of Epstein's litigation history. The information control around client emails suggests a managed communication strategy. The post-departure contact suggests the personal relationship extended beyond the professional one. The null compliance result documents a remarkable absence — the primary relationship manager was either insulated from compliance scrutiny by design or by institutional failure. None of this establishes criminal intent.