[GRADE A1 — NYDFS Consent Order (regulatory enforcement action)]
The consent order attributes the following actions to ATTORNEY-1:
- Held authority to conduct transactions on Epstein's accounts as Epstein's personal attorney
- Made 97 cash withdrawals from DB's Park Avenue branch (2013-2017) — the consent order states all were "in the amount of $7,500 per withdrawal, the Bank's limit for third-party withdrawals"
- Total cash withdrawn: The consent order states "more than $800,000 in cash from Mr. Epstein's personal accounts" over "a roughly four-year period"
- Inquired about alert thresholds — The consent order states that in May 2014, ATTORNEY-1 "inquired into how often he could withdraw cash on behalf of Mr. Epstein without triggering an alert." RC-1 emailed the branch manager: "asked how often they could come in to withdraw cash without creating some sort of alert... Is it once a week? Twice a week? Once every other week?"
- July 2017 incident — The consent order states ATTORNEY-1 "asked a teller whether a withdrawal transaction in excess of $10,000 would require reporting and, upon being advised that it would, broke up the withdrawal transaction over two days"
- When confronted by AML OFFICER-2 about structuring patterns, the consent order states ATTORNEY-1 "represented that he had not intended to structure cash withdrawals. Bank personnel found ATTORNEY-1 credible and permitted him to continue"
- Final withdrawal — The consent order states that "just prior to the Bank's closing of the Park Avenue Branch... ATTORNEY-1 withdrew $100,000.00 in cash on behalf of Mr. Epstein"
- Explanation given — The consent order states ATTORNEY-1 reported Epstein "needed the funds for tipping and household expenses"
WHAT THIS SHOWS AND DOES NOT SHOW: The consent order documents a pattern of cash withdrawals at the bank's third-party limit, an explicit inquiry about how to avoid triggering alerts, and a single documented instance of splitting a withdrawal across two days to stay below the $10,000 CTR threshold. The consent order describes this pattern as "suspicious cash activity" that the bank failed to adequately investigate. It does not state that Indyke was charged with structuring (31 USC §5324) or any other offense. The consent order penalized Deutsche Bank, not individual actors. Whether Indyke's actions constitute criminal structuring is a prosecutorial determination that has not been publicly made.